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In this lecture I want to consider some ethical aspects of economic analyses of health and
disease. The focus will be on the relations between on the one hand health economics, on the
other hand utilitarian ethics; i.e. the thesis that maximising the sum total of good in society
is the morally right thing to strive for.
Utilitarianism:
In any choice situation, the morally correct choice is to maximise
the expected sum of good in society
(where the ”good” can be conceived of as happiness, welfare,
QUALYs, etc.)
Epilepsy surgery is chosen as the main example in order to show that an abstract ethical
discussion may have concrete implications for epilepsy outcome resarch. As an introduction,
a few elementary facts and distinctions concerning health-economic analyses will be
recapitulated. After that, you will be introduced to a certain discussion in the recent
philosophical literature, and a thesis about the proper limits of utilitarianism as a decision
tool in the allocation of medical resources will be presented. This thesis is then applied to the
field of epilepsy surgery.
Let us first have a brief look at some paradigms for economic analysis in medicine. The
terminology used here is essentially that of Shorvon 1996.
Cost-effectiveness: cost ~ medical improvement
Typical result: Surgery costs $X per seizure-free patient.
Cost-utility: cost ~ global measure of gain
(Also often referred to as ”cost-effectiveness” analysis.)
Typical result: Surgery costs $X per gained QUALY.
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Cost-benefit: cost ~ monetary measure of gain
Typical result: Surgery costs society $X and earns $Y.
Shorvon S, Models of Economic Appraisals in Epilepsy. In: Economic Evaluation of
Epilepsy Management (Pachlato Ch & Beran R G, eds., London 1996).
A cost-effectiveness study (in the strict sense) relates the cost of an intervention to the good
that it does, where the good is measured by some objectively defined parameter, usually a
medical variable. A typical example would be a comparison of the cost of epilepsy surgery
with its outcome, quantified by means of the percentage of patients rendered seizure-free. The
disadvantage of such studies is that because of the idiosyncratic outcome parameters, they
cannot be meaningfully compared with studies from other fields, say, heart surgery.
Because of the last-mentioned fact, health economists have designed the cost-utility study
(often also referred to as a kind of ”cost-effectiveness” analysis). In an ideal such study, the
outcome is measured in terms of its effect on global well-being, or quality of life, or utility,
which is supposed to be a common measure of value in any human life. In many medical
applications, utility is operationalised as QUALYs, quality adjusted life years. The value of
living a year with a certain medical condition can be determined by letting a sample of
well-informed persons ”trade off” such a year against a shorter life with full health (or against
a smaller probability than 1 for a year with full health). Hence the QUALY does reflect, at
least approximately, people’s informed preferences about their own lives. There are many
well-known problems (of both an empirical and a conceptual nature) involved in the
determination of QUALYs for different medical states, but these problems are not at issue
here.
Recently, some cost-utility studies of epilepsy surgery have been published, and I will take
two of them as examples here. Both, by the way, are called ”cost-effectiveness” studies by
their authors. In a New York study, Langfit determines the cost per QUALY of epilepsy
surgery, including evaluations of patients who are then not operated, to $15.581. In a
Pennsylvania study described by King and his co-authors, the corresponding figure is $27.200
per QUALY.
ESE-and-surgery cost per QUALY:
1. $ 15.581
Langfitt J, Cost-effectiveness of anterotemporal lobectomy in medically intractable
complex partial epilepsy. Epilepsia 38 (1997), 154-63.
2. $ 27.200
King J, Sperling M, Justice A & O’Connor M, A cost-effectiveness analysis of anterior
temporal lobectomy for intractable temporal lobe epilepsy. Journal of Neurosurgery
87 (1997), 20-28.
Part of the difference between the studies can be explained by the fact that King et al do not
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include that effect on QUALYs which is due to many patients having their seizure situation
relieved without becoming seizure-free.
A cost-utility study can give guidance about the relative benefits derived from two medical
interventions, even if they concern different diseases. But it cannot tell us whether, in an
absolute sense, the results are worth their costs. Now, both of the mentioned studies do
include a comparison with norms concerning acceptable dollar per QUALY quotients. King
et al quote a proposal by Kaplan & Bush that $50.000 should be regarded as an acceptance
limit, while Langfit quotes tentative Canadian guidelines saying that treatments which cost
less than $19.000 per QUALY are almost universally regarded as appropriate ways of using
society’s resources. How such norms and limits are established is another question which,
regrettably, I cannot go into.
In some areas of economic analysis, notably transportation and environment, a form of study
called cost-benefit analysis has been used. In a cost-benefit analysis, the benefit derived from
an intervention is translated into economic terms so as to become commensurable with the
cost. In principle, such a translation could be performed by letting people value QUALYs in
economic terms. There are however many difficult problems involved in this, a major one
stemming from the fact that the value of money is not constant between people (money is
worth more for poor people). These problems certainly extend beyond the scope of this
paper, so let us concentrate on the cost-utility analysis and its central component, the
QUALY.
In 1995 and 1996, an interesting debate took place in the well-renowned Journal of
Medical Ethics. The main combattants were two moral philosophers: John Harris of
Manchester University, England, and Peter Singer from Monash, Australia. Singer stands for
the utilitarian viewpoint, while Harris is outspokenly anti-utilitarian.
Harris J, QUALYfying the value of human life. Journal of Medical Ethics 13 (1987),
117-23.
Singer P, McKie J, Kuhse H & Richardson J, Double jeopardy and the use of QUALYs
in health care allocations. Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (1995), 144-50.
Already in 1987, Harris had challenged the use of QUALY analysis in medicine, arguing that
assessing the effects of medical interventions in terms of quality-adjusted years is unfair
towards people who have a low quality of life. To support his point, he constructs the
following example. I have simplified it a little to make it more transparent.
Suppose that both of two 30 year old women, Karen and Lisa, have a severe heart condition
and are candidates for immediate heart transplantation, but that it is only possible to operate
on one of them. Their expected life-length after the transplantation is the same, 40 years.
However, 20 years ago Karen suffered from a disastrous car accident which left her with a
quality of life permanently only half of Lisa’s. Assuming that Lisa’s quality of life can be set
to 1, Lisa’s expected gain from the transplantation is 40 quality adjusted years, while Karen’
expected gain is only 20 QUALY’s.
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The case of Karen and Lisa (version 1)
 
 
Subject QoL before op. Exp. QoL/LL QUALY gain
Karen .5 (last 20 years) .5/40 years 20
Lisa 1 1/40 years 40
 
Utilitarianism: You must choose to operate Lisa
Harris: This decision is unfair towards the less well-off
It is quite clear that a utilitarian would decide the case in favour of Lisa. But this is unfair,
says Harris, since it in effect doubles the burden on Karen. Not only is she less well-off
before the decision, but she also loses the competition for medical resources. Instead of using
the utilitarian, QUALY-maximizing principe, says Harris, we should value Lisa’s and Karen’s
lives equally highly - and toss a coin to decide.
Singer and his co-authors argue against Harris’s point in several different ways. One line of
argument is highly abstract and seeks to prove by an apriori argument that utilitarianism is a
rational view to hold. I will not go into this argument here. Singer’s second line of argument
is to show that Harris’s way of reasoning ? giving equal value to all lives ? yields absurd
results in several other examples. And Singer constructs a number of fictional  cases to show
this. The essence of these cases can be captured by modifying the Karen & Lisa example.
Suppose, for example, that Karen and Lisa both have had a high, full quality of life before the
transplantation, but that for some medical reason, Karen’s life expectancy after the operation
is only 20 years while Lisa’s is still 40.
The case of Karen and Lisa (version 2)
 
Subject QoL before op. Exp. QoL/LL QUALY gain
Karen 1 1/20 years 20
Lisa 1 1/40 years 40
Singer et al: It is evidently not unfair to choose Lisa here.
So, Lisa expects 40 QUALYs from the transplantation, and Karen expects 20. Singer would
say that the self-evident choice is to treat Lisa. No unfairness is implicated by such a decision.
From such fictional cases, and from the abstract argument which I mentioned earlier, Singer
concludes that utilitarianism and maximization of expected QUALYs is, after all, the proper
rule to use for resource allocations in medicine.
I will not follow out all the intricacies of the ensuing discussion, since it is enough for my
purposes to emphasise two points.
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(1) The first one is that Harris, in his argumentation, relies heavily on a principle of equal
rights to life, for all human beings irrespectively of their quality of life and expected
remaining lifetime. In the following, I will avoid debating this principle and only discuss
choices between treatment alternatives which do not differentially affect life expectancy. But
it should be mentioned that the principle of equal rights to life, or something like it, seems to
be a well-entrenched moral principle among people in general. In a recent, Norwegian
willingness-to-pay study of three alternative medical services, where the participants were
informed about the expected benefits of the alternatives, people revealed a ten times higher
willingness to pay, in terms of Norske Kroner per QUALY, for a life-saving helicopter service
than for an extension of a quality-of-life enhancing hip surgery program!
Willingness to pay for 3 different programmes
 
Ambulance Surgery Hip repl.
WTP/year 316 306 232
QUALY gain 150 200 1125
WTP/QUALY 2 1.5 0.2
 
Olsen J A & Donaldson C, Helicopters, hearts and hips: using willingness to pay to
set priorities for public sector health care programmes. Social Science and
Medicine 46 (1998), 1-12.
Legislators and decision makers who want to promulgate a policy of QUALY maximisation in
medicine must certainly respect such public opinions. It is quite another matter whether these
opinions can be supported by rational arguments.
(2) The second thing to note about Harris’s argument is that his main example involves a
principle of compensatory justice, which, in turn, can be seen as a special case of a more
general equity (or egality) principle. Remember that in the original version of the Karen &
Lisa case, Karen has suffered for 20 years from the consequences of the car accident, while
Lisa has had a good life. Hence, it can be argued, it is fair to compensate Karen for her past
suffering rather than to give even more to Lisa. In other words, by choosing to transplant
Karen’s heart the sum total over time of good in Karen’s and Lisa’s respective lives become
more equal than if one had chosen to transplant Lisa’s heart. It is important to note that this
element of compensatory justice is lacking from the modified Karen & Nina case, in which
Singer argues that QUALY maximisation is self-evidently right. Here, the assumption was that
Karen and Lisa were equally well-off up til now, so nobody has to be compensated for
anything.
As just noted, the principle of compensatory justice can be seen as a special case of a more
general principle of equity. In many decisions concerning resource allocations, another
application of the principle of equity is possible. Suppose, for a final fictional example, that
Karen’s and Lisa’s pre-operative lives were equally good overall but that last week, Karen
fell victim of the disabling traffic accident. Let us also imagine that in this case, the heart
operation is not life-saving but only quality-of-life preserving. Lisa’s quality of life will be 1
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with the operation instead of 0.7 without it, while Karen’s (because of the accident) will be
0.6 with the operation and only 0.4 without it.
The case of Karen and Lisa (version 3)
 
 
Subject QoL before op. Exp. QoL/LL  wo and w op. QUALY gain
Karen .6 (but most of  her life, 1)
wo: .4/40 years  
w:   .6/40 years 8
Lisa 1 (but .6 for a  week at age 7)
wo: .7/40 years  
w:   1/40 years 12
 
Comment: Compensatory justice is not relevant here, only
prospective fairness.
The expected gain for Lisa is greater than the one for Karen, but is it right to choose Lisa for
heart surgery? Many would say that ”prospective” equity considerations, referring to a
comparison of Karen’s and Lisa’s expected quality of life without an operation, dictate that
we do the other way round.
Now, at least for cases in which the differents results of alternative medical intervention only
concern the quality of life and not its quantity, it seems to me that a compromise position
between Harris and Singer is both possible and rational. If no element of compensatory
justice, nor any other equity concern, is involved, as in the second Karen & Lisa case above,
simple QUALY maximisation is allowable. If, however, one of the participants has been
considerably less well-off earlier in life, there should be a trade-off between the expected
benefit and the previous deficit so that only a fairly large difference in added QUALYs can tip
the balance in favour of the person who is better off from the beginning. Similarly, any
prospective inequality, i.e. any future inequality which results from the intervention, should
be weighted in.
Many different compromise standpoints are possible depending on what is, according to
one’s moral standpoint, a ”fair” balance of the utilitarian principle against these two aspects
of equity. Here is also the proper place to note that most so-called egalitarians (including the
present author) would not let a difference in well-being between two subjects count for much
if both of them are very well-off. This standpoint means that inegality as such is not the
target, only inegality which implies a bad life for the worse-off.
Let us now have a look at the relevance for epileptology of the Singer-Harris discussion. I
will outline just one situation, out of very many, in which compensatory justice and
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prospective equity could come into play and change a decision of resource allocation for
epilepsy.
The population of patients which, potentially, could benefit from epilepsy surgery is, as we
all know, heterogeneous, and the patients have varying prognosis. For example, patients for
whom there is reason to expect that their partial complex seizures are due to a circumscribed,
unilateral temporal focus will probably benefit substantially from an epilepsy surgery
evaluation, while the expected gain is lower in those cases where there are signs of more
extensive brain damage and perhaps multifocality. At the same time, the not-so-
good-prognosis patients are often less well off from the beginning than the good-prognosis
ones. This is partly due to the fact that extensive brain damage is often accompanied both by
a low quality of life and by a low expected gain from an epilepsy surgery evaluation.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the the expected cost per gained QUALY for a
certain not-so-good prognosis patient is twice that of a good-prognosis patient, say $ 40.000
as against $ 20.000.
A fictive choice in Epilepsy Surgery Evaluation
 
 
QoL Exp. gain Cost/QUALY
Patient 1 .5 .1 $ 40.000
Patient 2 .7 .2 $ 20.000
 
Comment: ”Efficient use of resources” (utilitarianism) dictates
that we should choose patient 2. But is this fair?
Imagine that because of economic restrictions, we are forced to prioritise between these two
and let only one of them have a surgery evaluation. At first look, this prioritising task may
seem simple indeed: Take the line of action which produces the greatest net benefit, which
means choosing Patient 2. But supposing, as we did above, that Patient 1 is less well-off from
the beginning (and not only less well-off, but really bad off; cf what just I said about
egalitarianism), couldn’t that be a sufficient reason for turning the table and spend the
resources on her? Note that both compensatory justice and prospective equity come into play
here. The not-so-good surgery candidate has suffered more during her lifetime, and although
the gain she expects from the operation is smaller than that which the good-prognosis patient
can expect, it is also a gain from a much lower expected level. So, are we really doing the
right thing if we prioritise operating the good-prognosis patient?
I do not want to resolve this issue in a dogmatic way by trying to tell you which moral
principle is the correct one. Instead I just conclude that it is essential for proper decision-
making concerning resource allocation in medicine that fundamental moral principles are
brought to light and discussed. The problem of the proper methodology for settling the big
theoretical questions which any such discussion actualises is not within the scope of this
paper. Instead I will summarise my main points by quoting another recent paper.
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Ethics is typically not considered in economic analyses. However,
ethical and economic aspects are not easy to separate. One
fundamental difficulty is that the foundations of the economic
analysis are ethically biased towards utilitarianism. In the choice
between different health care allocations both economic and ethical
aspects must be considered. If this ethical bias inherent in economic
theories is not recognised, the choice could be dubious from an
ethical point of view.
Malmgren K, Hedström A, Granqvist R, Malmgren H & Ben-Menachem E, Cost
analysis of epilepsy surgery and of vigabatrin treatment in patients with refractory
partial epilepsy. Epilepsy Research 25 (1996), 199-207.
Thanks to Bengt Brülde and Kristina Malmgren for helpful comments on the manuscript.
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